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2Summary
The main points of this submission are:
1. The most important distortions of agricultural trade practised by the US are
unaffected by the FTA and are, in effect, endorsed by Australia’s signature to the
agreement.
2.  Considered in isolation, there is little to commend the proposed agreement. As
regards goods, the agreement fails to address the main distortions, such as the US
Farm Bill and the protection of the US sugar market while imposing a substantial
loss on Australian taxpayers in the form of reduced tariff revenues. Impacts on
services are modest.
3. The main adverse impacts of the proposed agreement lie in areas that ought to be
outside the scope of a trade agreement. The most notable, as regards the
commitments actually entered into, is intellectual property.
4. A Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States should be
confined to the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. Issues relating to
economic integration should be dealt with in a multilateral context and in a manner
that does not prejudice the democratic rights of Australians to control their own
social and economic institutions.
5. Parliament must assert its capacity and responsibility to determine Australian law,
rather than being bound by the conclusions of closed-door negotiations.
Objectionable provisions of the FTA requiring legislative change, such as the
extension of copyright, should be rejected. It would then be up to the US Congress to
decide whether to accept an agreement which, while still weighted in favour of US
interests, was less unbalanced than the current proposal.
3ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES
The FTA should be assessed in two ways. First, it is necessary to consider the
specifics of the agreement as it currently stands. Second, and more importantly, this
agreement must be viewed as the beginning of a process of economic integration
with the United States. It is necessary to consider both the desirability of such a
process and the likely terms on which it would develop. The terms of the proposed
FTA provide important evidence regarding the likely terms of future integration,
and, in particular, the policy areas that would be subject to negotiation.
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT PROPOSAL
Liberalisation of trade in goods
The situation before the Free Trade Agreement
Australia has very few barriers to trade in goods, and even fewer that are
significant in relation to our trade with the United States. Our general tariff of 5 per
cent is at a level which  can be justified under the revenue tariff provisions of the
GATT. The main areas of  higher tariff protection, the motor vehicle industry
textiles, clothing and footwear industry are areas where the United States has little
capacity to export to Australia.  There has been some criticism of Australia’s
quarantine policies, but these policies are designed to focus on science-based analysis
of disease threats rather than on protection for domestic producers.
Similarly, Australia has very few policies that subsidise exports or otherwise
distort international market prices. Most agricultural industries receive minimal
assistance. Single-desk selling policies for some agricultural commodities have been
criticised as anti-competitive, but the cost of such policies, if any, is borne by
Australian producers. Thus far, most producer groups have concluded that benefits
such as the pooling of risk outweigh any costs from forgoing a choice of export
marketers.
By contrast, the United States has a wide range of barriers and distortions,
particularly in the agricultural sector. The most important set of distortions are the
broad-ranging production and export subsidies contained in the Farm Bill passed in
2002. This Bill provides for $US190 billion in subsidies over 10 years to US
agricultural industries including grain, cotton, wool and dairy. Subsidised exports of
4these commodities depress world prices and harm all Australian producers,
regardless of whether they are in direct competition with subsidised exports.
By comparison, although they have received more attention, restrictions on
imports to the US are of less significance. The most important barriers relate to
sugar, beef and dairy products, and there are a range of less significant barriers.
As in Australia, the US also provides significant protection to a small group
of manufacturing industries. The pattern is largely symmetrical, with motor vehicles
and TCF being notable beneficiaries. This symmetry reflects the fact that, in both
Australia and the United States, these industries have declined as a result of
competition from Asia.
The bilateral balance of trade shows a strong surplus for the US. Conversely,
Australia currently collects substantially more revenue from tariffs on imports from
the US than does the US from tariffs on Australian exports. This is important in
assessing the distribution of costs and benefits from the FTA.
The content of the proposed FTA
As has been widely publicised, the proposed FTA removes most tariffs and
trade barriers, but makes no change in US restrictions on imports of sugar from
Australia and only modest and gradual changes with respect to imports of beef and
dairy products.
More importantly, no changes are proposed to the US Farm Bill. Not only is
the general system of subsidies unaffected (it would perhaps have been utopian to
hope for broad-based reform) but there does not even appear to be any
commitment to avoid the use of export subsidies that directly harm Australian
exporters in particular markets. Indeed, it appears that the issue of the Farm Bill was
raised in the negotiations. The most important distortions of agricultural trade
practised by the US are unaffected by the FTA and are, in effect, endorsed by
Australia’s signature to the agreement.
  Reflecting the symmetrical nature of the two countries’ patterns of
comparative advantage and disadvantage, there are exceptions to the general
pattern of complete removal of tariffs, notably with respect to TCF.
Economic analysis
Economic analysis of policy proposals may be based either on first principles
or on economic modelling. The proposed FTA is too complex to be analysed simply
in terms of first principles. Nevertheless, a great deal of insight can be obtained from
5simple parametric models of various aspects of the proposal.
As compared to a large-scale simulation model, this approach has the
advantage of clarifying the processes leading to estimates of costs and benefits. A
large-scale model offers greater precision and the capacity to model policy outcomes
for particular regions and industries. However, where there is a large divergence in
estimates of aggregate outcomes between simple and elaborate models, this
divergence is rarely a consequence of greater precision in the elaborate model. More
frequently, the divergence is the result of differences between the economic
assumptions used to ‘close’ (that is, derive an equilibrium for) the elaborate model
and the economic assumptions used in the simple model. Hence, there should be no
automatic preference for the results of more elaborate models. What matters is the
validity of the core assumptions.
In the debate over the proposed FTA, many commentators have sought to
make arguments based on first principles to show that the proposed agreement
must be beneficial, even if the United States retains significant barriers. The implicit
model is that of a small country unilaterally reducing tariffs on a non-discriminatory
basis. In this case, the world price is unchanged by tariffs, so the entire burden of the
tariff falls on domestic consumers. Provided that the tariff revenue can be matched
by a less distorting tax, reducing the tariff unilaterally will improve welfare.
Unfortunately these commentators fail to take account of crucial
qualifications in the above statement that make it inapplicable in the context of the
proposed FTA.
In this case, in general, the benefits of the cut in Australian tariffs will be
shared between consumers in Australia and exporters in the US, while the cost will
fall on Australian government revenue. The final incidence depends on the share of
imports supplied by the US and on the extent to which imports from the US and
other suppliers are substitutes. Since the US share of imports is fairly small, and
substitutes are available in most cases, it is likely that most of the benefit will go to
US exporters. This is a special case of the larger literature on trade diversion and
trade creation, all of which casts doubt on the claim that bilateral free trade deals will
be economically beneficial to the parties concerned.
A straightforward first approximation to assessing the issues in the case of
the US-Australia FTA is to look at the reductions in tariff revenue. Since the US
supplies about 20 per cent of Australia’s imports and the revenue from general
tariffs is around $2 billion, the likely cost is around $400 million per year.
6It is, of course, necessary to take account of the corresponding benefits to
Australian exporters. The benefits estimated by CIE before the conclusion of the
agreement rested heavily on trade diversion, and in particular, increased Australian
access to the highly-protected markets for sugar, beef and dairy products. Given
that the final agreement
In fact, it is arguable that the agricultural components of the deal should be
given a negative value rather than a small positive one. By accepting a long-term
agreement on such unfavourable terms, Australia precludes the possibility of
negotiating a more favourable agreement with a subsequent government, and
reduces the likelihood of securing broader access through multilateral processes.
Services and investment
The impact of the proposed FTA on services is relatively modest. Although
there are some provisions in both Australia and the US that discriminate against
noncitizens, these are relatively modest. Moreover, some of the most important
policies of this kind, such as restrictions on airline services, have been excluded from
the scope of the agreement.
The main interest therefore relates to possible future developments, going
beyond the removal of overt discrimination against noncitizens. These are discussed
below, particularly in relation to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
It should be noted that the services sector was responsible for a substantial
proportion of the gains from an FTA estimated by the Centre for International
Economics. In view of the modest scope of the actual agreement, it seems likely that
these gains have been overestimated.
Similar points apply in relation to investment. It appears that the threshold
for Foreign Investment Review Board review will be raised, but this will have little
direct impact since hardly any proposals are rejected. The main issue is the
"standstill" approach central to the agreement, which allows for the creation of new
rights for investors in future, but makes it almost impossible to withdraw rights that
have already been granted.
Of more concern is the possibility that some future agreement will create a
right of foreign investors to seek 'review' of decisions they allege to be
discriminatory against them. This provision, embodied in NAFTA and the aborted
Multilateral Agreement on Investment is said to be justified on 'level playing field'
grounds, but actually produces discrimination in favour of foreign investors, since
7domestic enterprises have no comparable rights.
Intellectual property
Under the proposed FTA, Australia is required to adopt American policies on
intellectual property, policies that are economically unsound even in the US context,
and entirely adverse to Australian interests.  Australia currently sets the term of
copyright fixed at fifty years after the author's death and publishers interested in
making public-domain works accessible to the general public are increasingly taking
advantage of this. By contrast, the United States has steadily extended copyright
terms. The proposed FTA sets a minimum copyright term of 70 years, but set no
maximum.
Many of the relevant issues arose in the case of Eldred vs Ashcroft, decided
recently by the US Supreme Court. This case was a constitutional challenge to a
recent Act of Congress which extended the term of copyright protection from fifty
years after the death of the author to seventy years (ninety-five for corporations).
The 'Copyright Term Extension Act' is often referred to as the 'Mickey Mouse Act'
because of the observation that the term of copyright is extended whenever the
Disney copyright on Mickey is about to lapse.
The constitutional challenge failed, but the case did elicit an unusual degree of
interest from American economists , seventeen of whom submitted a brief to the
Supreme Court opposing the Act. The list is striking not only because of the
eminence of the signatories (five Nobel Prizes and more to come) but because it
represents all shades of economic opinion from free-market luminaries like
Buchanan, Coase and Friedman to interventionists like Akerlof and Arrow.
The central theme of the economic critique is that copyrights and patents
cannot be appropriately analysed in terms of the protection of ‘intellectual property’.
Copyrights and patents are monopoly rights. It is necessary to strike a balance
between the incentive to inventive and creative work provided by copyrights and
patents and the economic costs of monopoly rights over ideas. Current US policy is
excessively favorable to monopolies.
This is also an area of concern in relation to future developments in the
process of economic integration with the United States. The current agreement does
not require Australia to match widely-criticised US policies such as the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. However, given the strength of the entertainment
industry and related lobbies in the United States, there can be little doubt that there
8will be continuing pressure for measures to enhance the  monopoly rights of owners
of intellectual property.
Effect on Australia’s international standing
The proposed agreement has been widely criticised, as encouraging
agricultural protectionism. For example, the New York Times, February 14, 2004
editorial, said
 The deal with Australia is a huge setback in the process of
liberalizing global agricultural trade. Poor nations whose only
viable exports are agricultural goods are hampered by excessive
protectionism. And by making a deal with Australia that leaves out
sugar, Washington has jeopardized chances for meaningful
progress on a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
the latest round of negotiations at the World Trade Organization.
As part of this effort to lower trade barriers, developing countries
are rightly insisting that rich nations stop subsidizing their farmers
and open up their markets to competition.
The agreement sends a chilling message to the rest of the world.
Even when dealing with an allied nation with similar living
standards, the administration, under pressure from the Congress,
has opted to continue coddling the sugar lobby, rather than
dropping the most indefensible form of protectionism. This will
only embolden the case of those around the world who argue that
globalization is a rigged game.
Similarly negative observations were made by US and international
commentators,  including the Washington Post,  the Singapore Straits Times,  and the
Miami Herald.
Despite official protestations, it is obvious that the agreement severely
erodes Australia’s credibility as a leader of the Cairns group. It is not hard to
imagine the reaction of the EU, for example, to any future Australian government
criticism of EU sugar policy. For a country supposedly committed to liberalization of
agricultural trade to make a bilateral deal with one of the leading practitioners of
protectionism, leaving the most egregious examples of protectionism in place, is
exactly analogous to a member of a wartime coalition making a separate peace.
9Summary
Considered in isolation, there is little to commend the proposed agreement.
As regards goods, the agreement fails to address the main distortions, such as the US
Farm Bill and the protection of the US sugar market while imposing a substantial
loss on Australian taxpayers in the form of reduced tariff revenues. Impacts on
services are modest.
The main adverse impacts of the proposed agreement lie in areas that ought
to be outside the scope of a trade agreement. The most notable, as regards the
commitments actually entered into, is intellectual property.
TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Much of the debate thus far has been based on misperceptions about the
nature of the proposed Agreement. As the main proponent of the agreement, Alan
Oxley of Austa has noted, the use of the term ‘Free Trade Agreements‘ is ‘ a
misnomer in a world of lower tariffs  .  Oxley writes
(http://www.austa.net/reports/report1.htm) ‘The World Bank prefers to describe
them as regional integration agreements. Free Market Arrangements would be an
even more appropriate term’.
In general, an integration agreement involves the adoption of common, or at
least compatible, economic policies on a wide range of issues, including intellectual
property, public ownership of infrastructure, and competition policy. Ultimately,
integration is likely to extend the provision and financing of health care and
education.
However, ‘integration’ is a misleading term in the context of a bilateral
agreement between Australia and the United States. Given the relative size of the
two countries, and the fact that the United States has adopted a general strategy of
seeking bilateral agreements on trade and other issues on a ‘pattern bargaining’
model, it is clear that any agreement will involve Australia adopting American
institutions and not vice versa.
This does not represent a difficulty for advocates of an FTA such as Austa.
Austa publications indicate a strongly-held belief that the economic and social
institutions of the United States are superior to those of Australia, and that we will
therefore benefit from an agreement which binds us to replace our existing
institutions with those of the United States.
In the case of the proposed agreement with the United States, there is a
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further reason why the term ‘Free Trade Agreement’. The most important barrier to
trade between the United States and Australia is the set of production subsidies,
export subsidies and restrictions on US agricultural imports generally referred to as
‘the Farm Bill’. Although some marginal concessions may be made, there is no
serious prospect that the Farm Bill will be repealed or modified in such a way as to
eliminate its adverse impacts on Australian farmers.
It would be preferable any Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the
United States should be confined to the removal of barriers to trade in goods and
services. Issues relating to economic integration should be dealt with in a multilateral
context and in a manner that does not prejudice the democratic rights of Australians
to control their own social and economic institutions.
Other integration agreements
A survey of previous integration agreements reveals two basic points that
are applicable to the proposed economic integration agreement. First, the scope of
such agreements is invariably much greater than is suggested at the time they are
originally negotiated. Second, once signed they are effectively immune from political
scrutiny. The result is a massive 'democratic deficit', in which citizens lose the
capacity to choose or control the economic and social institutions that shape their
lives.
The democratic deficit has been recognised as a major problem in the
European Union, where it has generated a vigorous debate regarding constitutional
reforms to the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of
Ministers. In relation to National Competition Policy and the World Trade
Organisation, issues of democratic accountability were ignored until the absence of
accountability produced a violent backlash.
Whether or not there is a backlash, it seems hard to see how any form of
democratic accountability could be imposed on an economic integration agreement
between Australia and the United States, short of Australia seeking to become a US
state itself.
The precedent of National Competition Policy
Australia has had recent experience of the use of intergovernmental
agreements, negotiation behind closed doors as a method of producing binding
commitments to far-reaching policy reforms. National Competition Policy, also
known as ‘Hilmer and related reforms’ was introduced in 1995, as a result of the
11
meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). This meeting resulted
in the passage through all Australian parliaments of legislation which fundamentally
affected all aspects of Australian life, from the opening hours of shops to the
employment conditions of workers. Yet until 1998, the majority of Australians had
never heard of National Competition Policy and only a tiny minority were aware of
what the policy involved.
 This situation changed dramatically with the 1998 Queensland election,
where the vote for the One Nation Party was attributed, in large measure, to
resentment at the perceived effects of National Competition Policy. In the resulting
backlash, critics blamed NCP for everything from unemployment to the decline of
country towns.
Unlike previous microeconomic reform initiatives, National Competition
Policy was a comprehensive program, which has been imposed from the top levels
of government without any consultation with those affected, and which was not
subject to significant democratic accountability or control.
Another top-down aspect of National Competition Policy is the strict
subordination of local government to State government. The operating
arrangements of local government authorities have been removed from the control
of the governments concerned and required to conform to policies laid down by
State governments in accordance with Competition Policy.
Finally, National Competition Policy has been largely exempt from
democratic accountability. It is, of course, open to the Commonwealth Parliament to
amend or repeal the Competition Policy Reform Act. But apart from this theoretical
possibility, it does not matter whether policy changes required under National
Competition Policy have majority public support or, indeed, any public support at
all.
The WTO
The debate over the World Trade Organisation has followed a pattern very
similar to that of the public response to NCP. The WTO was designed as part of a
comprehensive free-market reform agenda for the world economy, replacing the
more limited General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. In the words of its secretary,
Renato Ruggiero, it was to provide ‘the new constitution of a single global
economy’.
The WTO is unelected and its processes are opaque and bureaucratic. Its
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decisions, affecting government policies on a whole range of issues, are made in
secret by panels of trade lawyers. However, since national governments have
signed off on the relevant treaties, the WTO claims a democratic mandate.
As in the Australian debate over competition policy, the advocates of the free
market had most of the running at first. A steady stream of articles, speeches and
books pointed out that in the new world of the single global economy there was no
alternative to comprehensive reform and the abandonment of old-fashioned policies
of government intervention. In particular, the new economy necessitated wholesale
privatisation, ‘the end of welfare as we know it’ and the abandonment of restrictive
labour market policies like minimum wages and unfair dismissal laws.
Environmental and food safety policies, seen by the free-marketeers as pretexts for
rent-seeking and protectionism, came in for particular attention. An article in the
pro-WTO Brookings Review, commenting on a WTO decision striking down part of
the US Clean Air Act, expressed the hope that trade reform and domestic policy
reform would go hand in hand.
The turning point came with the semi-secret attempt to negotiate a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which would have required signatory
countries not to discriminate against foreign investors. As the example of the WTO
showed, this would have meant that any policy that adversely affected a
multinational company (whether or not any discrimination was intended) could be
challenged and overturned in closed tribunals. National governments began
demanding exemptions in areas where they were unwilling to accept MAI dictation -
culture for France, indigenous rights for Norway, and so on. The growing list of
exemptions simply pointed up the all-embracing nature of the proposed agreement,
and swelled the international wave of protest until the MAI was abandoned.
The European Union
The European Union is noted by Austa as a model for integration
agreements. It illustrates the tendency for the scope of such agreements to expand
over time and the difficulty of resisting such expansions. The original European Coal
and Steel community was established in 1951, with the aim of preventing a
recurrence of war between France and Germany,
As late as the 1980s, the then European Community was, for practical
purposes, a Western European customs union whose main policy initiative was the
Common Agricultural Policy. These were managed by an unelected Commission,
analogous to the WTO, and a Council, in which each national member had one
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representative and an effective right of veto.
In 2002, the customs union, the Commission and the CAP are still there, but
the European Union is more like a federal government than a trade bloc. New
members of the European Union must implement 31 chapters of the treaty,
covering everything from fiscal policy to the protection of workers rights. In effect,
the treaty requires its signatories to become social democracies.
The anti-democratic features of the gradual loss of national sovereignty in
the European Union have been a source of much concern. The response has been to
convert Europe from a trade bloc to something approaching a federal state (the
term 'confederation', used by the American colonies before the adoption of the
Federal US constitution is perhaps more appropriate. Europe already has many of
the standard trappings, including a flag, a currency, passports, a parliament and the
beginnings of an army. The  directly-elected European Parliament is still weak, but
its power and legitimacy is growing. The replacement of the national veto by
'qualified' majority voting is gradually changing the character of the Council, from a
venue for intergovernmental negotiations, to something more like the original
version of the US Senate.
No such response will be available in the context of the democratic deficit
associated with economic integration with the United States. The US jealously guards
its national sovereignty and has shown itself unwilling to cede any, even to its
NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico. Australia, a country of which most Americans
are barely aware, will have even less capacity to influence events.
Bilateralism and multilateralism
Concerns about the relative merits of bilateral and multilateral agreements
have been raised in relation to trade in goods and services.
The issues are much sharper in relation to economic integration agreements.
In principle, Australia could negotiate separate agreements with, say, the US,
ASEAN and the EU to remove tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods and
services. By contrast, the natural outcome an economic integration agreement
creates a bloc. If Australia has an economic integration agreement with the United
States and New Zealand does not (as seems likely) there will come a time when the
requirements of the US agreement are inconsistent with those of Closer Economic
Relations with New Zealand.
Although details remain unclear, it appears that the Japanese government
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believes the proposed FTA to raise issues in relation to existing agreements between
Australia and Japan, particularly as regards Most Favoured Nation treatment of
investment. Since our economic relationship with Japan is of considerably more
importance than that with the United States, it is highly undesirable that it should be
disrupted. However, conflicts of this kind seem likely to multiply under a bilateral
approach.
Health
Health, including food safety, was central to the negotiating demands of the
United States in the current FTA. Although the concessions made by Australia were
(at least apparently) minor ones, they open the door for further demands in the
future.
As in the case of intellectual property, the outcome of any agreement that
would satisfy the US will be the replacement of successful Australian policies by
economically and socially unsound US policies that benefit only powerful lobby
groups.
In relation to genetically modified foods, for example, Australia reached a
sensible compromise between the extremes represented by the US and Europe.
Under the labelling laws adopted here, consumers are free to choose between
traditional and GM foods. The US negotiating position proposes that we should be
forced, like Americans, to consume GM foods without knowing it.
Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme will come under continued
attack. As noted by Alan Oxley of Austa in a 3CR interview recently, the PBS has
been the subject of vigorous attack by US pharmaceutical companies and their
Australian subsidiaries. While the scheme is not directly attacked in the proposed
Free Trade Agreement, its fate will be sealed once the agreement is signed.
Looking ahead, it seems inconceivable that Medicare will be safe from attack
under the provisions of an agreement. The private insurance lobby in Australia has
opposed Medicare since its exception, and would be strengthened immeasurably by
the much large and stronger US industry. The single-payer and bulk-billing
provisions of Medicare, already under severe strain, could be rendered unworkable
by legal challenges under an FTA.
RESPONSES
Unlike the situation in the United States, treaties entered into by Australian
governments do not require ratification by Parliament. However, some provisions
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of the treaty will require legislative changes.
Not coincidentally, since the provisions requiring legislative changes are
precisely those that go beyond trade into matters of domestic law, the provision
requiring domestic legislative change include a number of the least satisfactory
components of the agreement. An example is the extension of copyright to 70 years
after the author’s death.
If the changes were the price of an agreement that was otherwise highly
beneficial, it might be reasonable to treat them as a package deal. As has been
shown above, however, the benefits of the trade component of the proposed FTA
are at best marginal and possibly negative. In this context, it is important for the
Parliament to assert its capacity and responsibility to determine Australian law,
rather than being bound by the conclusions of closed-door negotiations.
Objectionable provisions of the FTA requiring legislative change, such as the
extension of copyright, should be rejected. It would then be up to the US Congress to
decide whether to accept an agreement which, while still weighted in favour of US
interests, was less unbalanced than the current proposal.
Concluding comments
As has been noted by its strongest proponents, the term ‘Free Trade
Agreement’ is a completely misleading description of the proposals currently under
negotiation. Many of these proposals will be economically harmful to Australia. But
even if they are not, they should be subject to vigorous public debate rather than
being negotiated behind closed doors. At present, the vast majority of Australians
are either  are under the impression that, as its name implies, it is concerned
primarily with such issues as tariffs barriers to agricultural trade. As with National
Competition Policy, there is likely to be a severe backlash if and when Australians
discover that secret negotiations have made radical economic and social reforms a
fait accompli.
